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Executive Summary
The current crisis is testing the capacity of policy makers to give adequate answers 
to the possibility of a major financial meltdown. The crisis began in the subprime 
sector, a relatively small segment of the mortgage industry. It is thanks to an 
insufficiently regulated system of financial innovations that it spread to the balance 
sheets of all financial institutions around the world. The briefing paper does not 
deal with the issue of what regulatory framework we should design. It rather 
focuses on the short run policy response to the crisis. I will conclude that most of 
the burden in this specific moment falls on fiscal policy, monetary policy having 
reached a liquidity trap situation. Nevertheless, monetary policy still has an 
important role (that it played already in the past months) in providing liquidity to 
the markets, and in facilitating the task of fiscal policy. In this perspective, I agree 
with Anne Sibert’s BP of March 2008, in considering appropriate a wider 
definition of acceptable collateral, to include also “troubled assets”. This should be 
done in the short run, though, and a number of medium term consequences, notably 
on the coordination between strictly interconnected fiscal and monetary policies, 
should be evaluated
2Last September the largest economies of the world came close to the 
collapse of their financial systems. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
triggered an uncontrolled panic, and a domino effect was averted only by a 
series of urgent and thus uncoordinated measures by most governments of 
the G7 countries.
The crisis has begun with the banks (in the US and then in Europe), to 
spread to all the financial institutions. Today, the whole set of financial 
assets is heavily depreciating, with the first effects on the real sector that 
begin to be felt.
This briefing paper will quickly trace the development of the crisis, and 
then analyze what are the tools that policy makers have available to tackle 
the crisis. Coherently with the request, it remains focused on the short run 
measures. I will not deal with the different issue of what regulatory 
framework should we design in the future to prevent other crises like this 
one to happen again. I will conclude that most of the burden in this specific 
moment has to fall on fiscal policy. Nevertheless, monetary policy still has 
an important role (that it played already in the past months) in providing
liquidity to the markets, and in facilitating the task of fiscal policy. In this 
perspective, I agree with Anne Sibert’s BP of March 2008, in considering 
appropriate a wider definition of acceptable collateral, to include also 
“troubled assets”. This should be done in the short run, though, and a 
number of medium term consequences should be evaluated
1. The Mechanism of the Crisis
The financial crisis, triggered by a modest number of defaults on 
subprime mortgages, has now the proportions of a global recession. The 
original defaults may be evaluated at around 300 billions of US dollars, an 
amount that is of an order of magnitude much lower than the financial 
distress it created. The mechanism is by now well known: a number of 
households in the US were able to access to subprime mortgages, in which 
the very home they were buying was used as collateral. The increase of 
housing prices allowed them to renegotiate the loans at better rates and/or to 
roll over their mortgages. When the housing market began unravelling, this 
refinancing scheme broke down, leading to defaults and foreclosures.
The total amount of subprime mortgages is rather small, around 1 500 
billions of US dollars. Even if we add credit card debt, we don’t go beyond 
2 300 billions. This represents about 20% of the total housing mortgages, 
and less than 4% of total household assets in the US (around 60 000 billions 
dollars).
3The losses linked to the subprime mortgages could have been easily 
absorbed by the system with losses limited to the imprudent lenders. But 
these mortgages have been the heart of a chain of financial innovations that 
multiplied the effects of the initial shock. Thanks to these innovations the
original lenders have been able to reduce their exposure to risk by packaging 
the mortgages into high yield securities sold to third parties. These securities 
were supposed to reduce the risk because of the lack of correlation between 
their components, and the dispersion of risks on a multitude of investors.
The party ended when the housing market slowed down; mortgages that 
would be viable only because the price of the collateral they were based 
upon was increasing, became “toxic”. The sources for refinancing 
households dried, and lenders driven to sell collateral of defaulting 
borrowers had to do it at very low prices, that imposed large losses. Risks
turned out to be correlated, and their scattering through securitization, 
instead of being a source of security, was the vehicle for spreading the 
infection to the whole system. Since the summer of 2007, a defining feature 
of this crisis has been the deep uncertainty of financial institutions about 
their own health, and the health of their neighbours
This deep uncertainty made banks reticent to lend to each other, and the 
interbank market dried up. This forced central banks to intervene since 
August 2007, to refinance banks and to inject liquidity into the system (see 
my Briefing Paper of March 2008)
The increasing distrust among banks is at the source of an important 
increase in risk premia (the spread between interbank market rates and main 
financing rates of central banks), that has never gone back to normal since 
the summer of 2007.
The crisis quickly engaged in a vicious circle, as banks tried to sell their 
assets in order to buy safe (public) debt, and stop the deterioration of their 
debt to capital ratio. But this race to sell further depressed prices and the 
value of their assets, thus worsening things even more
Today the crisis is spreading to the real sector. In an attempt to recover 
more reasonable ratios, banks hoard the liquidity they obtain, and if they 
lend they do so at extremely high rates. On the other hand, firms tend to use 
their own cash flow to restore more prudential ratios of debt to capital –
especially in view of the shrinking value of their shares -- thus postponing 
investment. Households suffer from a negative wealth effect, as the value of 
their assets dropped sharply, and hence are reducing consumption. The 
result is a generalized decrease of aggregate demand that pushes the 
majority of economists to forecast a recession for at least the year 2009.
42. The Policy Response
There is an ongoing debate on the long run lessons to learn from the 
current crisis, and on whether (and if) the financial sector should in the 
future be more regulated. This being said, we can notice the unusual 
phenomena that economists are rather consensual in their analysis of what 
should be done in the short to medium run to contrast the crisis and shorten 
as much as possible the slowdown.
The tools that are debated are the standard ones, monetary and fiscal 
policy. I will discuss them in what follows.
2.1 Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy has been rather active, and within limits it had been 
effective. As said above, since the beginning of the crisis central banks have 
flooded the markets with liquidity, and eased credit conditions; this 
happened through conventional and non conventional interventions, and as I 
argued before (Briefing Paper March 2008), with different macroeconomic 
effects: while the Fed proceeded with both aggressive rate cuts (3.75 points 
from August 2007 to October 2008) and liquidity injections, the ECB 
privileged the latter measures, and started cutting rates only last October 
(after an increase in July 2008!). The two strategies were equally 
successfully in terms of providing liquidity to the interbank rates and to 
contrast the tendency of short run rates to increase, but had different effects 
on long term rates, and hence on the macroeconomic environment 
(European long rates remained substantially larger than their US equivalent. 
We may start to feel the difference now that the crisis is quickly spreading 
to the real sector.
Central banks also put in place non conventional interventions, with the 
specific objective of ensuring sufficient liquidity to the interbank market, 
and de facto substituting commercial banks in that market. Open market 
operations have been reinforced notably by expanding the range of assets 
required as collateral, and including assets whose value was difficult to 
determine in the market. Furthermore, central banks have increased their 
exposure, by engaging in longer term loans to the banking sector.
This set of measures has not been as effective as it was hoped, in 
restoring confidence in the interbank market. Whatever the amount of 
liquidity injected into the market it was of an order of magnitude much 
lower that the one usually reallocated through the interbank market. Until
very recently, when governments intervened directly, that market remained 
substantially non-functional.
5As successful as it has been in avoiding a financial meltdown in the 15 
months passed since August 2007, basically by partly substituting 
commercial banks in the interbank market, monetary policy has not been 
able to restore confidence. Commercial banks are forced to take an 
important rate (and reputation) risk when they access to the central banks’ 
lending facilities. The massive injections of liquidity into the system have 
been hoarded (or invested in safe public bonds) by banks in an attempt 
(vain, given the sharp reduction in stock market prices) to restore more 
sensible prudential ratios. The liquidity trap re-emerged from economic 
history books, and is presently well installed in our financial systems.
Monetary policy has run out of steam, at least as the main tool of policy 
intervention.
2.2 Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy came late into the picture. It is only with Freddy Mac and 
Fanny Mae in September, that governments started asking how to intervene 
to stop the crisis. As of today, because of the difficulties experienced by 
monetary policy, governments are the main actors in the management of the 
crisis
Like for monetary policy, fiscal policy intervention may happen by 
conventional and unconventional means. The consensus among economists 
on the unconventional means is amazing1. While details on the 
implementation may differ, the consensus is that the UK plan unveiled by 
Gordon Brown on October 8 contained all the elements needed to address 
the crisis2.
a) The priority was to address the malfunctioning of the interbank 
market, caused by both substantial mistrust among institutions, and 
by insufficient capitalization of financial institutions
b) That was done through equity injections (debt/equity swaps), and 
with specific conditionality (executive pay, dividend policies, and 
above all lending requirements) to minimize the cost on taxpayers.
                                               
1 See for example the instant books published by VoxEU.org : “Rescuing our jobs and 
savings: What G7/8 leaders can do to solve the global credit crisis” (October 9, 2008), and “What 
G20 leaders must do to stabilize our economy and fix the financial system” (November 11, 2008). 
Both instant books are edited  by Barry Eichengreen and Richard Baldwin, and are available for 
download at www.voxeu.org
2 See for example “Gordon does good”, by Paul Krugman, The New York Times, October 13, 
2008.
6c) In addition to deposits, bank loans were guaranteed by the 
government, in order to eliminate the counterparty risk that had 
frozen the interbank market.
The Euro group first and quasi simultaneously, the European Union 
then, adopted a similar programme.  
. The fact that most European countries put in place a similar framework 
for intervention has to be applauded, because coordination increases the 
chances that guarantees will not be used (hence minimizing the actual cost 
to taxpayers) and, even more importantly, it reduces conflicts and free riding 
problems (as for example the ones experienced when Ireland unilaterally 
decided to guarantee bank deposits). Similarly, the initiative of a special 
short term lending facility of the IMF will be extremely important for 
countries (like Switzerland) whose GDP is largely inferior to their banks’ 
exposure.
After some initial hesitation, the American Treasury adopted a very 
similar strategy, and abandoned the idea of simply buying the toxic assets
As a consequence of these measures, confidence is slowly being 
restored, and we lately observed a slow “unfreezing” of the interbank 
market.
Even the conventional tools of fiscal policy are being put in place or 
considered, to sustain aggregate demand. Last spring the American 
government sent a check to all households, and on November 9, 2008, China 
announced a fiscal stimulus package that will bring 586 billion of US dollars 
of spending (roughly 7 per cent of the country’s GDP) on railways, airports 
and other infrastructure, and on social welfare projects. Japan followed suit. 
The European Commission and the Council certified that the current 
situation represents the “exceptional circumstances” that the Treaties 
recognize as justification for a softening of SGP constraints.
Nevertheless, the need for traditional stimulus packages is less 
consensual among economists and policy makers. The G20 communiqué of 
November 15 takes a bold and unusual stance, in stating that, among the 
immediate measures to contrast the crisis, governments should
“Use fiscal measures to stimulate domestic demand to rapid 
effect, as appropriate, while maintaining a policy framework 
conducive to fiscal sustainability.”
Nevertheless, large European countries are proceeding in sparse order, 
and in particular Germany, is resisting the pressure for an important fiscal 
7policy stimulus3. This is unfortunate, because a coordinated effort would 
first and foremost be more effective, and then once again avoid free riding 
of countries increasing their exports thanks to their partner’s fiscal stimulus 
packages.
I believe that an important and coordinated fiscal stimulus, (quantified at 
the OFCE to be of the order of 2-3 percentage points of GDP), is necessary 
in European countries to soften the impact of the crisis on the real economy 
and on investment expectations. The director of the IMF proposed a fiscal 
stimulus of the same order of magnitude (2%)
3. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination
In the preceding sections I clearly stated that the main actor in today’s 
management of the crisis is fiscal policy, both via the conventional and 
unconventional instruments described above. The injections of liquidity by 
central banks had an important role in preventing a meltdown of the 
financial sector, but were less effective in restoring the normal business 
conditions.
Nevertheless, central banks still have a very important role to play to 
support the effort of fiscal policy and to help shorten the transition out of the 
crisis, thus substantially reducing the costs for society as a whole.
First, in the case of the ECB, interest rates should be lowered 
significantly. It is today very clear that the rate raise of July 2008 was a 
mistake. And the two cuts of October and November 2008 were too small 
and too late. While this may not be the recipe for a better functioning of the 
interbank market, it will certainly help sustain the efforts of treasuries to 
provide the guarantees needed to restore confidence. Furthermore, lower 
ECB rates should drag down long term rates and ease borrowing constraints 
for firms that today pay prohibitive interest (see my Briefing Paper of March 
2008).
Second and we come to the main question of this briefing paper, the 
ECB should consider accepting toxic assets as collateral at its lending 
window. As Anne Sibert convincingly argued in her March 2008 Briefing 
Paper, the banks needing liquidity are those who can only offer toxic assets 
as collateral, while those with good assets will more likely need less 
liquidity. Reducing the rates without expanding the range of collateral 
would have the effect of channelling the liquidity where it is less needed.
                                               
3 “Call for German Stimulus”, Financial Times, November 20, 2008
8The situation resembles the one of Japan in the 1990s. Had the central Bank 
of Japan intervened earlier to buy the toxic assets held by the banking 
system, the episode of deflation would have been shorter and less 
pronounced. 
A number of things have to be considered nevertheless. Contrary to most 
observers, I do not believe moral hazard to be a major problem in the current 
situation. Certainly it is a problem but the formal statement of most heads of 
governments that no bank would be let go bankrupt supersedes the risk for 
the ECB to give wrong incentives in accepting toxic assets as collateral. And 
at any rate, the risk of moral hazard could be minimized first by explicitly 
making it a short term measure,  and then by devising a sanction for banks 
using the lending facility to dump toxic assets on the ECB without really 
needing it (a temporary or even long banning from the lending facility?). On 
the other hand, what I believe to be a potentially serious issue is the effect 
on the balance sheet of the ECB. Any serious problem deriving from this 
deterioration of the balance sheet would most likely have to be covered by 
government intervention. How to split the burden across Euro area 
governments may be a difficult problem, but the solution is strictly 
technical. Secondly, I don’t see as realistic the threat of a political problem, 
in the form of a loss of independence of the ECB; even if this were possible, 
the number of governments involved would of course be a guarantee for 
independence.
The only potential problem which may turn into an opportunity is the 
fact that the current crisis is substantially blurring the distinction between 
fiscal and monetary policy. The boundary becomes fuzzy. Some central 
bank interventions have direct fiscal consequences, as it was crystal clear in 
the action of the Fed before the “nationalization” of Freddy Mac and Fanny 
Mae. Lending by the States to the private sector out of public borrowing is 
similar to the business of a bank and it has the effect (through the credit 
multiplier) of increasing the global amount of credit, that is a money 
counterpart, and thus of increasing the “quantity” of money.
Managing this mix of monetary and fiscal policy will require an 
unprecedented (and much awaited) effort of coordination between the 
European Central Bank and the governments of 15 euro zone countries. This 
is unchartered land even from a theoretical perspective, and a potentially 
dangerous situation if we look at the poor track record of cooperation 
between the ECB and euro zone governments. But it may also constitute the 
opportunity to finally think about redesigning the economic governance of 
the Euro area, as I have been constantly advocating in the past
